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Under Familiar Fire: Making Decisions 
During the “Kivu Crisis” 2008 in Goma,
DR Congo  
Silke Oldenburg 
Abstract: This paper explores the decision-making processes used by the 
inhabitants of Goma during the Kivu Crisis in October 2008. The paper’s 
aim is twofold: After providing a short history of the October 2008 events, it 
seeks in the empirical part to distinguish and clarify the role of rumours and 
narratives in the setting of violent conflict as well as to analyse their impact 
on decision-making processes. As the epistemological interest lies more on 
the people who stay rather than those who flee, in the second part the paper 
argues that the practice of routinization indicates a conscious tactic whose 
purpose is to counter the non-declared state of exception in Goma. Routini-
zation is defined as a means of establishing order in everyday life by referring 
to narratives based on lived experiences. 
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Fieldwork under Fire1
It's Wednesday, 29 October 2008. The war in eastern Congo, which 
has been resurfacing since the end of August, has advanced to the 
gates of Goma. Laurent Nkunda, the renegade rebel general, is threat-
ening to take over the city. The night over Goma is filled with flashes 
of red light which you could mistake for fireworks if you didn’t know 
that it was live ammunition. It's 8 p.m. My host father identifies the 
sound of AKs and grenades and indicates where the shooting sounds 
are coming from. Not very comforting – at least not for me. There is 
no electricity; the radio reports on the latest troop movements. De-
spite the ongoing exchange of fire, the sonorous snoring of my host 
father starts – just like every evening in the living room – soon fol-
lowed by the regular breathing of my host mother. I myself will face a 
rather sleepless night (fieldnotes, 29 October 2008, Goma). 
Everyday life in a setting of violent conflict is more complex than the 
stereotyped view of chaos and disorder presented by the media and some 
international aid agencies. Life goes on, but the big question of interest is: 
How? Or better yet: How are people confronting situations of uncertainty, 
how are they interpreting and perceiving these moments of imbalance, and 
how are they integrating those moments into their daily lives? This paper 
explores the decision-making processes of Gomatraciens2 during the “Kivu 
Crisis”3 in October 2008. The aim of this paper is twofold: After providing a 
short history on the October 2008 events, it seeks in the empirical part to 
distinguish and to clarify the role of rumours and narratives in the setting of 
violent conflict as well as to analyse their impacts on decision-making proc-
esses. In the second part, the paper argues that the practice of routinization 
indicates a conscious tactic for taming the non-declared state of exception in 
1  Cf. Nordstrom and Robben 1995. 
2  Gomatraciens are the inhabitants of Goma. I cannot verify the term Goméen which 
Vlassenroot/Büscher (2009: 11) claim is preferred locally. While I was conducting 
fieldwork, Gomatracien was how the people of Goma referred to themselves. As 
Goma can be considered historically a melting pot, its population is highly ethni-
cally and socially diverse. Ethnic backgrounds are being manipulated by different 
militias. Obviously, there is no “Gomatraciens’ perception” but I will emphasize 
certain existing tendencies I was able to observe within my pool of interviewees 
who came from various social strata, diverse ethnic backgrounds and different age 
groups. 
3  In this article I refer to the “Kivu Crisis” when discussing events during the period 
from the end of August 2008 (the relaunch of the CNDP offensive) to January 2009 
(Nkunda’s arrest). A special focus is on “the last week of October”, when the 
CNDP threatened to take over the city of Goma. CNDP stands for Congrès Na-
tional pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People). 
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Goma.4 Routinization is a means of establishing order in everyday life by 
referring to narratives based on lived experiences. In this sense, being “un-
der familiar fire” indicates a social condition which could be addressed by 
reflecting on persisting narratives, ad hoc rumours and personal experiences 
in the complex scenario of the Congolese war. The material in this paper is 
based on anthropological fieldwork carried out in Goma from March to 
December 2008 and from June to September 2009.5  
Goma: Tales of a Cursed City 
More than a century passed between Conrad’s depiction of the Congo as a 
“heart of darkness” (Conrad 1899) and the contemporary notion of the 
“First African World War” (Prunier 2009). All this time, the Congo was 
considered a “space of death”, as Taussig indicated, referring to the time of 
colonization (Taussig 1992b). During the Mobutu era, Goma was known as 
a tourist spot, picturesquely situated on the shores of Lake Kivu, rich in 
ecological diversity and famous for its rare species like okapi and mountain 
gorillas. Today the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is excluded with 
warnings in the latest Lonely Planet guide for Africa.  
Goma, a town of 600,000 inhabitants, is the capital of the North Kivu 
province and is situated approximately 2,000 kilometres from the Congo’s 
capital, Kinshasa. North Kivu has always been a hub of migration and 
commerce – the exchange of people and goods – between the west and the 
east of Central Africa. The arrival of nearly two million Rwandan refugees, 
the overthrow of the long-lasting Mobutu system, the so-called “war of 
liberation” and the following RCD rebellion,6 the transitional phase, as well 
as the current Third Republic under elected President Joseph Kabila, indi-
cate a rapidly transforming socio-political environment. Furthermore, the 
ethnic complexity of North Kivu is a major source of misunderstandings, 
tensions and conflict. But what unites the populace is the perspective on 
4  The analytical concept “state of exception” will be introduced in the second part of 
this paper. Borrowing from Agamben’s philosophical approach (2004), I stay true 
to the English translation of his book’s title while appreciating that in popular and 
legal contexts alike the terminology “state of emergency” is more prevalent. 
5  Fieldwork was conducted for my Ph.D. project, “Growing up in Goma: War, 
Youth and Everyday Life.” This project was supervised by the Bayreuth Interna-
tional Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS) and was funded by the Hans-
Böckler Foundation. 
6  RCD = Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie was the Rwandan-allied 
rebel movement that triggered the Second Congo War and took the stage on 
2 August 1998 in Goma (for a detailed discussion see Tull 2005). 
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Goma as “cursed city”: la ville maudite.7 Interestingly, this is based not on the 
dangers of war but refers instead to the Nyragongo volcano, which erupted 
in 2002, destroying 20 per cent of the town with two massive lava flows. In 
consequence, the airport’s runway was also damaged, causing several major 
plane accidents in recent years.  
CNDP: Si vis pacem, para bellum!?8
After having lived the last 20 years in a climate of instability, there is a long-
ing for a “strong man” in the Congo. By adapting Bissell’s concept of “co-
lonial nostalgia” (2005), one could nearly speak in the Congo of a “dictato-
rial nostalgia” displayed by those who sometimes recollect the “good old 
times” under Mobutu Sese Seko. For some people, Laurent Nkunda repre-
sented this hope for a new “strong man” as the territories controlled by his 
CNDP had the reputation of being well governed. Because of the assumed 
ethnic make-up of this rebel movement, there was, however, a lot of re-
sentment in the population of Goma, a feeling mostly related to Rwanda’s 
involvement in the Congo Wars.9 The emic equation of Nkunda with the 
CNDP reveals a strong identification with the Tutsi and with Rwanda in 
general. For a majority of Gomatraciens, Nkunda was synonymous with the 
CNDP; therefore, he was the threat. Before founding the CNDP, Nkunda 
fought in several rebel movements during the different wars, and the CNDP 
was popularly perceived as a recycled rebel movement. In 2006 he formed 
the National Congress for the Defence of the People with the objectives of 
restoring sovereignty and good governance in the DRC and promoting secu-
rity, especially for the ethnic minority of Tutsi to which he belongs. The 
CNDP legitimized their actions by referring to the presence of former Hutu 
genocide fighters in the Kivu provinces. After military strikes in 2006 and 
2007 and the peace accord of Goma in January 2008, the CNDP restarted 
7  “Goma: Tales of a Cursed City” alludes to de Boeck’s book, “Kinshasa: Tales of 
the Invisible City” (2004), which points out the ambiguous character of Goma 
from an emic perspective. 
8  “If you wish for peace, prepare for war”; the CNDP claimed that this Latin prov-
erb was biblical in origin in order to legitimize its offensive, even though the origi-
nal source is unknown (personal communication by a CNDP spokesperson, August 
2008, Kitchanga). N.B. The names of my interviewees quoted in this article have 
been changed. 
9  It would go beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the complex war setting in 
the Great Lakes region. For information see e.g. Mamdani 2001, Lemarchand 2009, 
Prunier 2009, Turner 2007. 
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an offensive in North Kivu in August which reached the gates of Goma in 
the last week of October 2008.  
For weeks, the question as to whether Nkunda would take over the city 
was discussed on local and diplomatic levels alike. The CNDP’s objective 
was to force the Congo’s current president, Joseph Kabila, into direct nego-
tiations, which Kabila subsequently rejected because he insisted on peace 
talks with all militias, not exclusively with the CNDP. In contrast to the 
FARDC,10 which is associated with bad morals and lootings, the CNDP 
prides itself on its own tight organization, discipline and eloquence and cites 
international organizations and the UN peacekeeping forces, MONUC,11 as 
witnesses to those qualities.12 This, coupled with the CNDP’s tendency to 
claim the moral high ground in its quest to provide security for the Tutsi 
ethnic minority,13 enabled the CNDP to gain sympathy internationally. In 
April 2008 an Indian colonel of the MONUC created a scandal by decorat-
ing Nkunda and characterizing the CNDP’s objectives as “noble”. On 29 
October 2008, the CNDP was just ten kilometres from Goma and declared 
a unilateral ceasefire while the FARDC fled the city. A curfew was imposed 
by the provincial government, and the population was on alert. On Monday, 
3 November, the schools reopened. The threat was over. Attacks, counter 
attacks and peace talks continued in the hinterland until January 2009, when 
Laurent Nkunda was suddenly put under house arrest by Rwanda, which 
came as a great surprise to the (inter)national media, aid workers, and locals 
alike. After the end of the fighting, part of the CNDP was integrated into 
North Kivu’s provincial government.  
10  FARDC = Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The FARDC are the integrated 
armed forces set up in 2003 in the transitional phase when the diverse militias were 
integrated into the regular forces by the process of brassage (mixing). The FARDC 
are accused of being responsible for the largest share of human rights violations 
(Baaz/Stern 2008). 
11  MONUC = United Nations Mission DR Congo. The MONUC is the largest 
peacekeeping mission worldwide. In Goma they have a very ambivalent position in 
the population, often being accused of collaborating with the CNDP. This is illus-
trated in the colloquial saying “No Nkunda, no money – no Nkunda, no job,” re-
ferring to the assumed interests of international organizations to keep the conflict 
alive with the aim of not losing their jobs. 
12  Personal communication of a CNDP spokesperson, August 2008, Kitchanga. 
13  This is similar to Rwanda’s governing RPF, which also used moral arguments to 
berate the international community, e.g. Ruanda: Pottier 2002: 154ff. 
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Nkunda ante Portas: Il y a l‘insécurité
The situation in the last week of October 2008 was hard to grasp. My gen-
eral impression from reading international newspapers and following TV 
reports was one of a literal state of emergency with people panicking and 
fleeing the city. But when I wandered around in the streets of Goma, talking 
with friends and acquaintances, many of them were laughing about the po-
tential threat and were making fun of my anxiety. Nevertheless, I still be-
lieved that they were somehow downplaying the situation and disguising 
their true feelings. For that reason, I was impressed when the aforemen-
tioned living-room scene took place. The different forms of dealing with 
uncertainty14 emerged very clearly in heated discussions spread throughout 
the national and international media that mentioned war or a security crisis, 
or even debated a potential future genocide. On the contrary, the emic view 
was Il y a l’insécurité (There is insecurity) – a popular saying referring to a 
threat also in other ethnographic contexts, e.g. la violencia in the case of the 
Guatemalan Civil War (Green 1999: 3) or la época de los problemas in the Peru-
vian case (Poole 2004: 57).  
The anthropologist Georg Elwert stated that conflict is neither chaos 
nor disorder, but follows patterns of social order. He claims that while peo-
ple don’t know when and with what kind of intensity violent conflict will 
happen, they do know the setting and the way to deal with it (Elwert 2004: 
29). This was also the case in Goma. While I was discussing my personal 
dilemma of “Should I stay or should I go?”, everyone had prescriptions for 
how to behave and what to expect, which covered a range from “You have 
to close your heart” to “Just lie down under the bed and wait.” However, 
not all people living in Goma are that accustomed to violent conflict, as the 
following field observation illustrates: 
One couple had a huge argument: Alain, a young banker from Kin-
shasa and living in Goma for a second year, was talking of “these 
crazy Gomatraciens with their horrible war” and fled to Rwanda. His 
girlfriend Mapendo, a native Gomatracien, talked about “insecurity”, 
was not impressed by the situation at all and refused to go with Alain 
14  “Uncertainty” as an anthropological concept still remains relatively vague. I use it 
picking up on the works of Utas (2005) and Vigh (2006) in a twofold way: first to 
refer to violent conflict which does not have to be situated in a context because it 
has turned into context itself (Vigh 2006), and second as a social practice shaped by 
the people themselves through “social navigation” and a sense of constant alertness 
(see Utas 2005, Vigh 2006), thereby laying the groundwork for the “normal state of 
exception”, a term that will be discussed in the second part of this paper. 
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because in her opinion, he was exaggerating and not behaving like a 
real man (fieldnotes, 25 October 2008, Goma).  
So, what was the basis for the different perceptions and interpretations of 
the situation? Obviously, it was experience. During the last 15 years of in-
stability and two major war incidents in Goma itself in 1996 and 2000, the 
inhabitants of Goma saw a lot, as demonstrated by the popular saying On a 
tout vu. This confirms Elwert’s observation that people might not be familiar 
with the intensity of violent conflict but what they are aware of is the setting 
and the way of dealing with it. This became especially visible in the different 
reactions of Mapendo and Alain: Alain, as a non-local, was not familiar with 
the setting and was fearing for his life; Mapendo, on the other hand, was 
experienced, thereby judging his behaviour to be exaggerated. Like many 
Gomatraciens, she used verbal tactics15 of de-escalation frequently heard in 
Goma like Il faut fermer le coeur (You have to close your heart) or Il faut devenir 
dur d’abord (First of all, you have to become hard), and she demonstrated her 
indifference by saying Bien ça passe ou ça se casse (Either it passes or it bursts). 
This perception of conflict indicates a conscious way of dealing with situa-
tions of uncertainty and refers directly to one’s experience/non-experience 
as the case may be. Between “knowing” and “not knowing”, “not wanting to 
know” is a crucial factor, as indicated earlier: Referring to Goma as a 
“cursed city”, solely focusing on the menace of natural disasters, dilutes any 
conflict-related threat: Bien ça passe ou ça se casse.  
“No Nkunda, no money – no Nkunda, no job”: 
Narratives of a State of Emergency
In the evaluation of my empirical data, I recognized two dimensions when 
talking about war and conflict: rumours and narratives. I begin by presenting 
different examples of rumours and narratives before going into a deeper 
discussion concerning their function in times of uncertainty. As an initial 
definition, I want to designate persistent accounts as narratives, whereas the 
ones of ephemeral character will be called rumours. I subsequently argue 
that rumours lead more often towards the choice “flight”, whereas narra-
tives are proof of an experienced way of dealing with situations of uncer-
tainty.  
15  For a discussion of tactics and strategies see de Certeau 1990: 57ff. 
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Example Narrative: “Balkanization”/Pays des Volcans 
To most Gomatraciens, the CNDP seemed to be manipulated by Rwanda, 
with Laurent Nkunda being merely a puppet. This view can be attributed to 
the role of Rwanda in the two Congo wars. Most people see the CNDP as a 
group of Tutsi rebels, even though the political-military operations staff is 
ethnically very heterogeneous. Gomatraciens very often reject this argument 
by saying: “The Tutsi is primarily malin, very smart.” Many, like Daniel, the 
leader of a local NGO, are convinced that this heterogeneity is a ruse to 
conceal the fact that only Rwandan interests are behind the CNDP, and that 
Rwanda in turn is being backed by the US. Daniel’s perspective on the con-
flict and the role of Rwanda in it is the following:  
What is the CNDP up to? They say they provide security and order 
and hunt down the FDLR.16 But what are they really doing? Appar-
ently, they’re emptying the territory. Have you ever seen a war where 
they try to wipe out everything? Masisi: empty! Rutshuru: empty! All 
these refugees are not FDLR militias, they are civilians. The objective 
of the CNDP is clear: In Rwanda, there are too many people and no 
land; in North Kivu, there are few people and very fertile soil. They 
have tried it in every war: The Tutsi of Rwanda want to make a ‘Bal-
kanization’ – they want to proclaim the Pays des Volcans [Land of Vol-
canoes] (Daniel, 18 October 2008, Goma).  
As in many other contexts of violent conflict, the question about access to 
fertile land is central to the understanding of conflict in eastern Congo, as it 
says a lot about political power, profit and control. Competition for territory 
has existed since colonial times and has led, since the 1990s, to violent 
clashes between the autochthonous ethnic groups (Bahunde, Banyanga and 
Banande) and the Banyarwanda, the latter of whom constitute the popula-
tion’s majority in North Kivu because of migration. They are claiming the 
right to political representation as well as to land ownership. During the 
years of conflict, the distinction between autochthonous communities and 
the so-called “Rwandophones” (Congolese Hutu and Tutsi) sharpened. A 
constant accusation against Rwanda is that they are trying to destroy the DR 
Congo. The most threatening scenario is that of “Balkanization”, the prob-
able falling apart of this huge country from which Rwanda would profit by 
taking the eastern parts of the Congo to form a new state, the Pays des Vol-
cans.17  
16  FDLR = Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda. 
17  I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who pointed out the historical roots of 
this narrative that go back to 1962 when autochthonous groups were requesting the 
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Example Rumour: “Intoxication” 
“We already know,” says 50-year-old housewife Marie on the morning of 
30 October, when the governor of North Kivu insisted on the radio that 
everything was under control.  
It's always the same, we stand between war and peace and everything 
will be OK, and then the next moment, someone is standing in front 
of your door with a Kalash [Kalashnikov rifle]. It was like that with 
the AFDL,18 with the RCD, and even when the volcano erupted. Do 
you think they will warn us? No! They are playing their games with us. 
In reality, they have already sold us (Marie, 30 October 2008, Goma).  
For some days, the rumour persisted that five to six million USD had 
changed hands from Rwanda to the North Kivu provincial government to 
take Goma without a fight. “That is intoxication! That is a betrayal of the 
Congolese people! How can they sell us?” asks Michel, an unemployed rep-
resentative of Goma’s Société Civile, who speculates:  
They have already stopped bargaining. This morning I saw FARDC 
soldiers fleeing towards Sake. The soldiers are all running away be-
cause they are afraid of Nkunda's army. They know that they have no 
chance, and now they are fleeing. Surely they’ve had orders from the 
very top (Michel, 28 October 2008, Goma).  
Example Combination of Narrative and Rumour:
“Infiltration”
While chatting with members of my host family, two men dropped in 
and stated that the CNDP had arrived at the airport. Twenty minutes 
later there was a phone call that des infiltrés had been seen in Katindo. 
This news was followed by a sudden commotion in town; shops were 
closing and people were trying to get home immediately (fieldnotes, 
28 October 2008, Goma). 
“Infiltration” is both narrative and rumour. On the one hand, it is a tactic of 
war the Gomatraciens refer to when remembering former war incidents. In 
this instance, infiltration is something people experienced and which was 
creation of the North Kivu province, a proposal subsequently rejected by Banyar-
wanda deputies. 
18  AFDL = Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre 
was the name acquired by the rebellion in 1996, which was created by Rwanda and 
Uganda and given a “Zairian” face by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (for a detailed discus-
sion see Willame 1999). These forces entered Goma on 1 November 1996. 
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quite persistent in social perception. Even the German embassy warned that 
the CNDP rebels were crossing the front lines in disguise, mixing with the 
refugees in order to destabilize Goma. On the other hand, “infiltration” can 
also be a rumour. The information that infiltrators were showing up in dif-
ferent places in town was circulated repeatedly via phone calls. Here its 
depiction as a rumour is appropriate because the verification or falsification 
of the details happens relatively quickly. 
The narrative of “Balkanization” and the rumours of “intoxication” 
and “infiltration” provide a picture of the political and emotional atmos-
phere in Goma at the end of October 2008. As indicated above, I want to 
differentiate between narratives and rumours. The longevity of “Balkaniza-
tion” as a way of explaining the genesis of war, particularly by many autoch-
thonous groups, might be perceived as a conspiracy or, alternatively, as a 
way of assigning meaning to a persistently unstable and potentially threat-
ening environment. Therefore, I suggest referring to long-term representa-
tions as narratives because of their relational character, being constitutive as 
sites of identity construction. “Intoxication” might belong to the narrative 
category because it is repetitive and connected to experience, but it becomes 
acute and circulates in the form of rumour mostly in times of uncertainty. 
The commonly held belief of “intoxication” and the observation of soldiers 
fleeing the city intensifies a feeling of general panic. In contrast to narratives, 
this rumour is highly situational. Whereas a large group of research partners 
would rely on narratives like “Balkanization” to make sense of their larger 
context in everyday situations, the trope of intoxication is not dominant in 
everyday explanations and can be read rather as a comment or response to 
extraordinary situations.  
Should I stay or should I go? – The Ingredients of 
Decision-Making
Decision-making depends on the formation of, and reflection on, certain 
narratives which can be reinforced by rumours, both narratives and rumours 
being socially constructed and locally meaningful. The combination of a 
narrative which highlights the evil character of one armed party and its for-
mer atrocities linked to the rumour that this group had just infiltrated 
Goma’s airport triggers a different set of decisions. People might panic and 
flee even if they are accustomed to the setting reflected in the narratives. 
The rumour alone would not be sufficient to provoke such a strong reaction 
without it being placed in a larger narrative context of experience. Carolyn 
Nordstrom observed that “narratives domesticate experience” (Nordstrom 
1997: 22), indicating that narratives contain or delete elements that “[make] 
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living in danger bearable”. In my opinion it can also be the other way round: 
Experience domesticates narratives. By using euphemistic labels such as l’insécurité 
(insecurity) or l’événement (event) while simultaneously more official sources 
talk of “war”, people tend to reassure themselves by playing down any po-
tentially hostile situation. Prerequisites for this tendency to play down a 
situation can be one or more of the following: a particular experience about 
conflict dynamics; persisting narratives and ad hoc rumours; and the per-
sonal background of the socially and ethnically diverse population. The 
decision-making of three interviewees (below) will illustrate this argument. 
 Case 1: A wealthy trader and native of Goma consciously appraised the 
situation as follows: He was assessing the usefulness of his existing 
networks in town, rethinking his ideological relationship with the 
CNDP, and weighing how his social status and reputation might help 
him to bribe the FARDC should they eventually come looting. The be-
haviour of this man was, in short, very much related to his experiences 
during the First Congo War, when, while he was fleeing, he was at-
tacked because of his close relationship with Mobutu. He considered 
the existing narratives and his personal experiences and distilled them 
into a set of possible scenarios, finally determining that staying at home 
was the lesser risk, eventually concluding that for him, the situation was 
not so dangerous that he should flee (fieldnotes, 25 October 2008, 
Goma). 
 Case 2: Bahati, a 32-year-old man from North Kivu’s hinterland in-
volved in Goma’s Société Civile was even surprised when I asked him 
about what he would do in case of an attack. He argued: “Why should I 
flee? I didn’t harm anyone. If you stay at home it is safer. There are so 
many houses, why should they come to yours? And when they arrive 
you could beg for your life, just give them all your money, that’s what 
they want. On the run you are more vulnerable. It’s on the run that 
people get robbed, women get raped, and others get killed” (fieldnotes, 
26 October 2008, Goma). 
These two examples of men choosing to stay in Goma resemble each other 
as both decided to stay due to the anticipated dangers of fleeing. The trader 
is referring to his personal experience but decides to stay because of his 
politically secure position, being “in” with one group and having the possi-
bility of bribing the other. Bahati, coming to the same conclusion, assigns 
some kind of rationality to the CNDP. Considering himself innocent (“I 
didn’t harm anyone”), he comforts himself with the thought that his house 
is one among many, so why should he be targeted? Drawing a parallel be-
tween the experiences of many Gomatraciens during the two Congo Wars 
and his own reading of events coupled with narratives and rumours, he uses 
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these experiences as a template for upcoming events. This same attitude was 
adopted by, for instance, my host mother, who told me frequently in this 
last week of October: On est entre la guerre et la paix (We are between war and 
peace). This statement reflects a highly analytical element combined with her 
personal experience that the situation could suddenly change. Nevertheless, 
she found a technique in order not to panic during an artillery barrage and 
continued her daily habits as usual, concluding the day with a nap in the 
living room before finally going to bed.  
The majority of my acquaintances stayed in Goma during the last week 
of October, convinced that Nkunda would not attack, that the MONUC 
would provide security in the end, that there would be more security in 
one’s own home, or they stayed because, ultimately, there was no better 
alternative, no place of refuge.  
However, many did flee. At the Congolese–Rwandan border, I ob-
served many Rwandophone people fearing possible acts of vengeance, and 
middle-class people fearing looting soldiers. A huge number of temporal 
refugees can be categorized as “non-locals”, including people from Kinshasa 
or other DR Congo cities working in the Kivus – not to mention the inter-
national expat community. Safi, a 25-year-old student explained:  
They are not used to war and insecurity like we are – the slightest 
alarm causes them to panic and they flee without thinking (Safi, 7 No-
vember 2008, Goma).  
The third example is one of flight: 
 Case 3: Alphonse, a kiosk owner of Nande descent who had been living 
in Goma for two years, decided to flee directly when he heard that the 
CNDP had taken control of the military basis of Rumangabo. He re-
ferred to narratives of Bukavu, the capital of the South Kivu province 
where Nkunda is accused of having committed severe human rights 
abuses in 2004. He told me in a phone call: “It doesn’t matter if they 
take my kiosk, I will restart from scratch. But these people, these Tutsi, 
they are really cruel; I don’t want to take the risk. They don’t like us” 
(Alphonse, 24 October 2008, Goma). 
This last quote refers to the events of Bukavu in 2004, which are, like most 
narratives, shaped and shared by a particular group of people who don’t 
always have the same opinion about what is going on. As this narrative was 
coupled with the rumour that the CNDP was approaching fast, it triggered 
Alphonse’s decision to flee. Implicit in this quote is the popular notion of 
“tribalism”, an ethnically motivated antagonism between different local 
communities, which is widespread in Goma. Tribalism thus reinforces the 
narrative’s interpretational strength and affords a point of orientation for 
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many people in this specific situation. As the first two examples have dem-
onstrated, the individual practice of decision-making is closely intertwined 
with collectively held narratives and rumours, reflecting continuous and 
integrated experiences in the light of narrational certainties like “corruption” 
and narrational advice on how to behave and stay out of trouble.  
Meaning Between Fact and Fiction 
As orientation is of utmost importance in times of uncertainty, it is not sur-
prising that some Gomatraciens developed a certain kind of nostalgia for the 
Mobutu era by praising elements like “sovereignty”, “unity” and particularly 
“stability”. Even though Mobutu was unpopular at the end of his rule, today 
there is a constant sense of lament. This longing for stability is not only 
indicative of economic crisis, as Ferguson demonstrated in the Copperbelt 
(1999), but it also illustrates a general “crisis of meaning”, as Filip de Boeck 
shows in the case of the DRC (1996: 92). There is a constant blurring of fact 
and fiction. In the Western imagination, war and violent conflict are mostly 
synonymous with destruction and misery, but war and violent conflict are 
also fundamental in the quest for meaning and explanations (e.g. Ferguson 
1999: 12; Finnström 2008: 167). In particular, by using narratives, people are 
trying to regain control over their daily lives, to interpret events and experi-
ences and organize and imbue them with sense (Maek 2005: 62). Reading 
the present into the past and turning experiences into narratives (Malkki 
1995), leads to the formation of social worlds that open up a space for ac-
tion, thus creating the possibility of confronting and handling violence. The 
act of anticipating a violent situation before it actually rears its head allows 
people to deal with violence on a routine basis (Vigh 2006: 151). By verbally 
reclassifying the potential war situation to one of insécurité, room to manoeu-
vre is retained.  
Rumours are mostly seen as symptoms of societal crisis, and they hint 
at a complex interplay between the addressed audience, the “public opinion” 
and the state’s view (Zitelmann 1998: 206). The discrepancy between the 
“information provided” and the “information needed” is a potent breeding-
ground for the emergence of rumours (Shibutani 1966: 62), which are 
closely linked to contexts of political violence (e.g. Bazenguissa-Ganga 1996) 
and war (e.g. Feldman 1995; Simons 1995). Anna Simons, in her essay on 
the beginning of the Somali civil war, characterized rumours as fluid, elusive 
and changeable, closely connected to the flux of human emotions (Simons 
1995: 57). Interestingly, Elwert argued that conflicts are not motivated by 
emotions but are rather based on “cool calculations” (Elwert 2004: 32). This 
is not only the case for the perpetrator(s) of conflict but is also implied in 
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the behaviour of the “ordinary” Gomatracien, as already mentioned: “You 
have to close your heart” is, in this case, evidence in favour of this argu-
ment.  
An overall expression for narratives and rumours could be “Radio 
Trottoir”, pavement radio, which is seen by Stephen Ellis as the “modern 
equivalent” of oral history, providing a political function and serving as a 
means of self-defence for the “poor and powerless” (Ellis 1989: 329). Fur-
thermore, Peter Geschiere refers to Radio Trottoir as a social-levelling 
mechanism which provides an egalitarian effect (Geschiere 1982) among par-
ticular groups and enhances a distinction between others (Olujic 1995: 193; 
Emcke 2004: 207ff). 
Thus, talking creates reality, whether this reality is “true” or not. Talk-
ing, naming, labelling and classifying assign meaning to apparently mean-
ingless incidents. Therefore, the repetitive use of narratives and ad hoc ru-
mours is a tactic useful for the interpretation of a hostile context – a context 
that can be tamed by “talking about it”. This raises the methodological 
problem of how everyday experiences, especially in situations of warfare 
(Maek 2005: 64; Taussig 1992a: 10; Green 1999), may be communicated in 
interview situations. While speaking and forming phrases, one aligns and 
orders one’s thoughts, conferring rationality to one’s own actions. The sub-
sequent legitimization of events in the form of talking produces legitimiza-
tion for decision-making processes. Again, the dimension of time becomes 
relevant in a context of uncertainty. If a decision is to be taken ad hoc, there 
is no space to ponder extensively about possible consequences or to take the 
time to connect events to personal experiences: The reaction is more in-
stinctive, despite the fact that a certain logical explanation will be suggested 
and conveyed subsequently to relate to the present or even the future. How-
ever, in a situation like the Kivu Crisis in October 2008, people were ob-
serving the upcoming events for several weeks, making decisions based on 
the interpretation of the murky complexity of rumours and narratives. 
Conclusion: Taming the State of Exception by
Routinization
“Routinizations are the last to be destroyed and the first to emerge in 
the onset of war” (Vigh 2006: 151). 
I have demonstrated in the empirical part of this paper how the practice of 
decision-making is linked to socially constructed rumours and narratives in 
general, and how these are linked to people’s perceptions and experiences. 
Finally, in my conclusion, I want to discuss some theoretical thoughts about 
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the general context, which I want to define with the oxymoron “the normal 
state of exception”. Borrowing Vigh’s use of “routinization” I want to em-
phasize that a conscious falling back to routine helps the Gomatraciens im-
provise within a state of exception and tame it by routinizing it.  
Recent anthropological work has done much to illuminate the contexts 
in which war and other forms of collective violence are experienced as states 
of crisis and how these contexts shape people’s identities. Even if in the 
Congolese case there was no declared state of exception (yet a curfew was 
ordered during the last week of October), I would like to draw on the ap-
proach articulated prominently by Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt and, most 
recently, Giorgio Agamben.  
The controversial German political theorist, philosopher and jurist for 
the Nazi regime, Carl Schmitt, was a mastermind of German authoritarian-
ism. In the early 1920s, he legitimized the state of exception as a legal form 
and stated in his work, “Political Theology”, that the ordinary rule of law 
becomes most evident in its exception. He claimed: “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the state of exception” – in other words, a sovereign with power 
to suspend the rule of law can transform a weak into a strong state by de-
claring a state of exception (Schmitt 2004: 13).19  
Walter Benjamin, one of Germany’s great intellectuals of the early 
twentieth century, a literary critic and philosopher, was a contemporary of 
Schmitt with whom he corresponded about this topic. Although Benjamin 
acknowledged, like Schmitt, that the state of exception is not the exception 
but the rule, he, in contrast, was hoping for the “real state of exception”, 
which for him meant overcoming the Nazi regime by means of rebellion 
(Benjamin 1974: 697).20 His provocative allusion was also designed to en-
courage rethinking notions of order and disorder; as Michael Taussig claims, 
“our very forms and means of representation are under siege” (Taussig 
1992a: 9). The state of exception as a concept regained prominence when 
the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, declared in 2004 that with the 
“war on terror” the state of exception became the governing paradigm of 
rule. His famous example is Guantanamo, an institution governed by a state 
but located outside that state’s territory and possessing no valid laws for 
detainees (Agamben 2004: 10). 
19  While the notion of Ausnahmezustand is translated as “state of emergency” in Benja-
min’s works “Trauerspiel” and “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, Schmitt’s elabo-
ration on Ausnahmezustand is translated as “state of exception”, as is the title of 
Agamben’s essay (“Ausnahmezustand”).  
20  Often neglected in the exegesis of Schmitt and Benjamin’s correspondence is the 
esteem Benjamin expressed for the latter (Weber 1992: 5ff). 
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A state like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, often characterized 
by political scientists as a weak (Englebert 2003), predatory (Reno 1998) or 
rhizomatic state (Bayart 1989), has not been able to control the different 
armed groups in the Kivus, and worse, the government is not even in con-
trol of its own regular forces, the FARDC. In this way, people connect the 
Kivu Crisis with the quest for sovereignty – something regularly reflected 
on, and included in, discussions about the “good old” peaceful days under 
dictator Mobutu. While I was chatting informally with a member of 
Nkunda’s medical staff, he argued that the Congo needed a dictator. He said 
“You know, the Congolese, they are suffering from brain leprosy. They 
accept everything as normal.” On the other hand, there is some power of 
the post-colonial state in contemporary DR Congo which manifested itself 
not only during the dictatorship of Mobutu, who seized power by declaring 
a state of emergency in 1965, but also in the periodic declaration of emer-
gency curfews. These were most recently justified by the government’s pro-
vision of security in the context of war and were accompanied by an arbi-
trary checking of documents as well as by the ubiquitous presence of many 
secret agents and civil informants.  
Frequently, violence is regarded as an omnipresent force, pervading so-
cial conditions as a “routinized, even socialized violence”, which operates 
not only in public or political arenas but also in the personal sphere, as Vig-
dis Broch-Due remarks (Broch-Due 2005: 2). I argue that it is actually the 
people who routinize their environment in their quest for order in their 
everyday lives. Picking up on Vigh, I label the phenomena observed in 
Goma “routinization”. To me, routinization is a tool for maintaining control 
and for establishing order in one’s everyday life. A routine contains elements 
of flexibility and ability, training and experience. If routine is indicative of 
the usual, unconscious habit of doing something, I propose that the notion 
of routinization would be appropriate for referring to people’s active and 
conscious ways of navigating violent conflicts. The room to manoeuvre may 
not be very great, but the technique of routinization is a way of taming the 
lived state of emergency. Arguing along with Nordstrom that narratives 
domesticate experiences, (and, as I assert, that experiences also domesticate 
narratives), interpreting war as l’insécurité is a way of proving to oneself that 
something more or less bearable is going on. You have to keep tuned in to 
pavement radio (as Stephen Ellis advises, 1989) to observe and interpret the 
jungle of narratives and rumours that lead to a conscious way of answering 
the question of “Should I stay or should I go?” This forces us to assume war 
and insecurity are heterogeneous spaces of interaction. Interpreted as a form 
of routinization, the integration of long-persisting conflict structures into a 
dynamic social life becomes a possibility and can be seen as a form of con-
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tinuous negotiation over established order. Where the state of emergency 
becomes normality, or even a “state of emergence”, as Bhaba points out 
(2003: 41), violence can be classified, anticipated, ritualized and mastered.  
This is highlighted by Paulin, a 21-year-old student who presents social 
reflexivity as an achievement of the population:  
I think here in Goma every adolescent knows how to reflect. He 
knows well that now we are in situation x and this will mean for the 
future y. One can predict the future (Paulin, 7 November 2008, 
Goma).  
To be precise, this anticipation makes people “routinize violence” in spite of 
being “routinized by violence”. This becomes evident in the paradox that 
occurs when the state of emergency turns normal and the evening nap in the 
living room can be maintained even in the hail of bullets – to the surprise of 
the anthropologist, whose techniques of routinization are not yet that well 
developed. 
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Unter vertrautem Feuer: Entscheidungsfindung während der  
“Kivu-Krise” in Goma, DR Kongo, 2008  
Zusammenfassung: Die Autorin des Beitrags untersucht Entscheidungs-
findungsprozesse der Einwohner von Goma während der Kivu-Krise im 
Oktober 2008. Nach einer kurzen Geschichte der Ereignisse wird im empiri-
schen Teil des Beitrags die Rolle von Gerüchten und Erzählungen für die 
gesellschaftliche Szenerie gewaltsamer Konflikte aufgezeigt und voneinander 
abgegrenzt und ihre jeweilige Bedeutung für Entscheidungsfindungspro-
zesse analysiert. Da sich das Forschungsinteresse der Autorin in erster Linie 
auf den Teil der Bevölkerung richtet, der am Ort des Geschehens bleibt, 
und weniger auf den, der sich zur Flucht entscheidet, wird im zweiten Teil 
des Beitrags die Praxis der Routinisierung hervorgehoben, eine bewusste 
Strategie der Betroffenen, um mit dem nicht-deklarierten Ausnahmezustand 
in Goma umzugehen. Routinisierung wird als Mittel definiert, die alltägliche 
Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten, indem man auf Erzählungen gelebter Erfah-
rung zurückgreift. 
Schlagwörter: Demokratische Republik Kongo, Goma, Ausnahmezustand, 
Kommunikation, Entscheidungsfindung 
 
 
 
